Meta & Children's Online Safety████: “oh my gosh yall IG is a drug”
████: “Lol, I mean, all social media. We’re basically pushers”
Meta & Children's Online Safety
A curated archive of internal Meta documents — emails, chat messages, presentations and research, unsealed in litigation — on the harms its products cause kids and teenagers.
Highlighted Quotes
████: “oh good, we’re going after <13 year olds now?”
████: “zuck has been talking about that for awhile”
████: “yeah it was gross the last time he mentioned it”
████: “targetting 11 year olds feels like tobacco companies a couple decades ago (and today).”
Robert Chen: “Short summary is ‘the young ones are the best ones.’ You want to bring people to your service young and early.”
Nicola Mendelsohn: “I would urge us to think again about why we are allowing this imagery to stay up — it is truly horrific and our clients, especially those that are parents, are finding it very difficult to square.”
████: “if the results are bad and we dont publish and they leak is it going to look like tobacco companies doing research and knowing cigs were bad and then keeping that info to themselves”
Malia ████: “The metric is ~500k victims [of Inappropriate Interactions with Children] per DAY in English markets only… So we expect the true situation is worse.”
Yoav Shapira: “Child Safety is explicitly called out as a non-goal in our H2 plans. So if we can do something here, cool. But if we can do nothing at all, that’s fine too.”
████: “What specifically are we doing for child grooming (something I just heard about that is happening a lot on TikTok)?”
████: “somewhere between zero and negligible”
████: “Oof. This statement that mark made isn’t accurate: ‘And we have additional systems that try to determine what someone’s age might be so if we detect that someone might be under the age of 13, even if they lied, we kicked them off.’ We don’t have u13 models today.”
Kevin Systrom: “I don’t think Mark understands the urgency of working on integrity related issues at IG.”
████: “I wish we had someone who could say ‘bombarding women with a message on how to become pretty multiple times per day is bad for their mental health’”
Guy Rosen: “this is the worst of the worst stuff that gives you nightmares, over which children have taken their own lives :(… both FB & IG are discovery services, not just communication services: you can do discovery e.g. search for girls a certain age in a certain place, etc. and then engage them… I think we have to be extra protective of what’s happening on discovery services because otherwise they are basically massive ‘victim discovery services’.”
████: “We have chosen not to perfect our age modeling to avoid the legal risks that come with actual age knowledge”
Antigone Davis: “we do very little to keep U13s off our platform.”
████: “We estimate that there are 3.5M profiles conducting Inappropriate Interactions with Children.”
████: “Every Human Exploitation stage (recruitment, coordination, exploitation) is represented on our platform.”
████: “there’s so much more we could have done here … [but] there was the explicit decision last half not to fund this anymore.”
Margaret Stewart: “It seems patently obvious that phone usage, selfie-culture, and photo editing are contributing to anxiety, depression, and body dysmorphia… I think we have to assume we are contributors/amplifiers”
Eduardo ████: “The moment Backpage was taken down, all of their data showed that IG had become the leading two-sided marketplace for human trafficking.”
████: “We did not provide resources to users who posted suicide or self-injury admission content or resources were provided late.”
████: “27% of all follow recommendations to groomers were minors”
████: “Teens talk of Instagram in terms of an ‘addicts narrative’ spending too much time indulging in a compulsive behaviour that the know is negative but feel powerless to resist.”
████: “We make body image issues worse for 1 in 3 teen girls”
Karina Newton: “We’re talking about actively encouraging young girls into body dysmorphia”
Yoav Shapira: “We’ve consistently deprioritized addiction as a work area, which I think is the right call”
Nick Clegg: “As discussed before, I think there are multiple reasons – of principle and of practice – why reversing our ban on surgical cosmetic features would be a very unwise thing to do. We would – rightly – be accused of putting growth over responsibility.”
Margaret Stewart: “I don’t think it’s the right call given the risks… I just hope that years from now we will look back and feel good about the decision we made here.”
████: “our age models are totally blind to this extraordinarily obvious exploit for the very abusive type we’re trying to solve for”
Darius Kilstein: “This was never really about increasing safety… It was all for the pR wins”
Melissa ████: “Some really yucky content. We’re sexualizing underage girls, promoting some very iffy accounts, and serving this content to people who didn’t ask for it instead of more inspiring interest content”
Thomas Kabbabe: “Thanks for flagging Melissa! I went to some of these accounts to check them out and they are FAR from being recommendable”
████: “Sex trafficking classifier: We have one engineer dedicated to this work and we have no data science support to do some basic understand work to lower the strikes threshold for prostitution and sexual solicitation strikes (currently set at 17x, which is too high).”
████: “Overall we are quite vulnerable when it comes to age management on our apps. To some degree that is because leadership has decided to live with certain risks at least in the near term.”
████: “The leadership decision was limited to NOT building an u13 classifier”
Christopher ████: “We do nothing on complex objects (notably clearly violating groups & pages)”
████: “In August 2020, we found out that there are ~38x as many [Inappropriate Interactions with Children] victims on [Instagram Direct Messaging] as on FB Messenger (Aug 2020). Despite this, [Child Exploitation Imagery] deletes on IG are ~21x lower and [Inappropriate Interactions with Children] auto-enforcing on IG is 90x lower compared to on FB.”
Darius Kilstein: “Have we considered settings to just let people turn off receiving messages from people that do t follow them?”
████: “We have, and [the Instagram Well-Being team] even explored private by default for teens but the growth impact was too high and the decision was to explore more nuanced and less blunt solutions.”
Pouya ████: “BTW this [Sitewide Emergency Event] is particularly painful. Thousands of minors have been reporting [Inappropriate Interactions with Children] T1 abuse and even though we knew that there is [Inappropriate Interactions with Children] T1 going on (more than 50% of which is sextortion which can lead to suicide) we haven’t done anything. We had a broken escalation path and no measurement. God knows what happened to those kids”
Tom Cunningham: “It seems clear from what’s presented here that some of our users are addicted to our products.”
████: “I’m very concerned about the lack of capacity, especially given our efforts on Youth across the company. I don’t believe this is well understood by leadership and would like us to raise awareness of this, so we can advocate to staff the teams better.”
“Perhaps the biggest issue: progress on [child safety issues] is hampered by lack of capacity. Indeed, we didn’t dwell so much on gaps on existing areas of coverage but they are substantial as well. Central Integrity has 1 [Data Scientist] on Child Safety.”
Sarah ████: “Internal child safety data analysis found that the daily number of minor victims having sex talk conversations in [Instagram Direct Messaging] with adults is 38x compared to FB (~200k victims/day). When normalized for the number of teens, the relative prevalence on Instagram compared to Facebook is about 5x.”
Shilpa Mody: “It turns out that at the high end, we really do recommend a LOT of high-[Negative Appearance Comparison] content to teens! Like for the top 10% of teens, our recs in Explore are 57% high-[Negative Appearance Comparison] :/”
Nick Clegg: “We are not on track to succeed for our core well-being topics (problematic use, bullying & harassment, connections, and [Suicide and Self-Injury]), and are at increased regulatory risk and external criticism.”
████: "before my time (when covid hit), the decision was made to prioritise our (tiny) amount of review capacity for English only, FB only… which means 1% of total report. Our goal this half it [sic] to be able to deal with 100%... and i'm pretty shocked i had to fight for resource to close that gap"
████: "i'm getting a bit tired of us being traded off against far more mild harms. I feel like all i do is escalate"
████: "look at this - i had to deprioritise goals AGAIN today because we have such a massive codebase to maintain"
Miki Rothschild: "How big is your team? It could be that the baseline resourcing needs some revisiting such that you don't have to constantly escalate."
████: "5 [engineers], 1 open head + 2[Data Scientists], 1[Data Engineer]"
Miki Rothschild: "And this is to cover all child safety problems? I.e. [Inappropriate Interactions with Children], [Child Exploitation Imagery] etc?"
████: "plus the multiple other problems that i have to 'non goal' on… no sexual child abuse… child nudity… which means i [sic] practice we have like 1 engineer for all of [Inappropriate Interactions with Children], one for all of [Child Exploitation Imagery] etc… which feels pretty wild to me."
████: "They keep saying leaks lower morale… no, Adam the choices you guys make lowers morale"
████: "On one hand we have Miki and ████ literally forcing the product team to make stupid decisions (teens dont want meditation, show lava lamps; or you can have the break without it being opt in first). On the other hand we get discredited for doing the best work we could."
Mark Zuckerberg: "I care deeply about this and we'll continue focusing on being industry-leading with young people, but I'm not going to say [child safety] is my personal main focus when I have a number of other areas I'm more focused on like building the metaverse."
████: "just feels like we're then making the rules for those exceptions, versus deciding to err on safety and just say under 16 accounts on IG are private… the risk could then be if u16s then switched to professional accounts so they could have public accounts – but im not sure how big a risk that is"
Elizabeth Crenshaw: "i dont disagree… but you know how contentious this change alone was"
████: "it's absolutely mad that it was so contentious… with adam or others too?... we will never get out of this mess if he/we're not just prepared to ERR ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY… jesus… i know i'm advocating for NOT letting them switch back – but i don't get why defaulting into private was contentious, given they CAN just switch back!"
Paniz ████: "Legitimacy: All three collaborations for Child Safety, Terrorism and Adult Sexual Exploitation are very high-profile given they relate to industry working together to stop high severity harms. Our legitimacy wins from participating in these efforts could easily become a legitimacy loss due to the scale of this feature gap."
Karina Newton: "can someone from [Central Integrity] with knowledge ping me off thread with legal counsel on how this gap was not previously known or tested?"
Adam Mosseri: "My primary goal was to ensure the app remains culturally relevant as measurement by sessions, time, and sharing, particularly with teens."
Gail ████: “I’m not worried about the general policy environment. I think in the regulatory environment we will have to explain why we currently allow 20 year olds to message 13 year olds. That seems like a far greater risk.”
████: “One flag for folks is that we have to be extra careful when conducting research to avoid conversations that highlight <13 yo with IG accounts.”
████: “Anecdotal evidence indicates that Teens see higher levels of non-rec content. An ex-Meta employee recently shared feedback that his teenage step-daughter’s Reels feed is highly offensive with content including: ‘people chugging alcohol and vomiting, blatantly racist jokes, pedophilia jokes, videos of people dying in car crashes, etc.’.”
Tomas Kabbabe: "Holy shit the WSJ article on Instagram and pedo recommendations is brutal"
Melissa ████: "I'm not surprised we have bad hashtags. our search safety team is a few employees who look at a list of popular hashtags every week to decide which to filter out :( it's super low tech… We also do very little to make sure handles are appropriate which is so creepy and problematic… The fact that we recommended the pedo account that activist viewed once to all her followers is really disappointing"
Tomas Kabbabe: "You'd think we JUST started working on integrity with issues like this one"
Tomas Kabbabe: "[I]t feels like we're so behind where we should be"
████: “Teens are still developing, novelty-seeking and impulsive… Cool, so we probably shouldn’t have ranking primarily driven by p(eyeballtime) and p(engagement), which is how it currently works.”
Rori ████: "[E]arlier today a man in Bosnia live-streamed the murder of a woman on IG and claimed to have murdered at least two other people, after which he reportedly took his own life… it is possible Meta may be criticised for the length of time the live stream remained on the platform (approximately three hours). There is no evidence that automation detected the video prior to removal and operational teams do not believe it should have based on the footage."
████: "BTW - through the protocol to identify over-age and under-age we probably have experience in identifying if a user is a teen."
████: "We do - however, we do not trigger an Age Verification in such a case today given the potential revenue impact it can cause."
████: “I feel like i’m reading totally different litigation and legislation than our org leaders… We literally are optimizing teen feeds for engagement. We can change that, but none of the [Youth Industry Practices] actually address this core issue.”
████: "Are the compliance people reading the same litigation and legislation that I am?"
████: "I am asking the same question"
████: "does ████ realize how the core algo is set up? Like it's literally just mathematically optimizing for vpvs and sessions *for teens* as with everyone else, which is the thing we're being told we cannot do…"
████: “the algorithm is absolutely tuned to maximize engagement in an maximally empirical, principle-less way.”
Carolina ████: "[B]ased on initial fan-outs, I'm seeing a lot of keyword obfuscation (i.e. 'megha' or 'megga' instead of 'mega', and instead of 'seller', using 'sellar' or 'zshaller') But also more obvious versions like, 'pizza mega sellers' or 'trusted cp seller'."
Gabriel ████: "[Accounts You May Follow] and Content filtering are still not where we would want them to be. There are multiple levers we could pull but all would take some focus and both eng+policy"
Praveen ████: "shared: Instagram_Instagram_s_Algorithm_Delivers_Toxic_Video_Mix_to_Adults_Who_Follow_Children_-_WSJ.pdf"
Tomas Kabbabe: "It is true that the article seems like an intentional hit piece… But at the same time, some of the content shouldn't be in the platform"
Praveen ████: "definitely agree - my guess is that it would look much much worse if we weren't doing enforcement. But it is concerning that our systems almost classify this type of contest as an interest category, and will serve a ton of it if we think a user likes it. can lead to pretty bad rabbit holes… i suppose it just reflects the reality that it is an interest category lol"
Tomas Kabbabe: "Honestly the hardest part of my job sometimes is realizing that humans can be very gross"
████: "They should audit every surface team's goal across the company, think about whether we would be comfortable telling the world that we are optimizing for x for their kid, and when the answer is no, come up with a defensible alternative."
████: "Imagine telling people we rank their kid's facebook by what makes them consume the most content IDs lol"
████: "this will be a public conversation and we are not ready for it"
████: "and then when they hear what things keep their kid consuming the most content IDs … we're off to the races on a really fun conversation."
████: “This is so crazy to me…We found groups of new teen users who see Reels just Filled with sexualized media after sexualized…like their whole tab”
Adam Mosseri: "FYI I don't think we can stop recommending teens to adults through [Accounts You Should Follow] on Instagram."
████: "Is anyone else receiving child abuse reports on platform? In the last 24 hours I've received a ton :( I've seen terrible things, we're not detecting it :(((("
Max Eulenstein: “No one wakes up thinking they want to maximize the number of times they open Instagram that day. But that's exactly what our product teams are trying to do.”
████: "Girls as young as 8 start to lose self-confidence b/c of negative self image and social comparison. It's when they become aware of their bodies vs. others."
Vaishnavi Jayakumar: "Yeah and we're playing the same role today in their perception of self-identity that magazines and music videos played when we were growing up"
████: "Exactly"
Vaishnavi Jayakumar: "And we all know how much those visuals impacted how we saw ourselves - I wanted to have pin straight long hair and hated my curls"
████: "That's exactly right. And the problem i had with the intervention proposal is that the magazines had to take more ownership of what they showed in their mags knowing that young girls were the biggest consumers of their publication."
████: "Also, one leverages user data in a way that I want us to think through holistically. It's invasive, in many ways, to know that we're analyzing the content you consumer and recommend something else. Outside of narrowly defined harmful content streams."
Molly Cutler: “On January 22, the BBC reported that exposure to graphic images of cutting and self-injury on Instagram contributed to the suicide of 14-year-old Molly Russell. Our policy permitted these images… Graphic images shared with no caption or context did not violate our policy… We had the wrong policy on graphic cutting images, and were too slow to reconsider/schedule engagement with experts about our policy in response to escalating criticism… We strategically de-prioritized [Suicide and Self-Injury] product work on IG.”
Nick Clegg: “four days after the BBC story broke I said publicly (carried in all UK headlines on the day) that we would review all our policies, and that we would do “whatever it takes” to address the legitimate concerns raised… it was not till the large meeting in Sheryl’s office… that there was any recognition that the policy was too heavily skewed towards the needs of those committing [Suicide and Self-Injury] rather than those susceptible to copying it… This lack of connection between what we commit to publicly and what we do internally really worried, and slightly shocked, me.”
████: “Can I please see the Mercury project results? ████ led me to ████ who is… not being responsive.”
████: “I actually DON’T have access to those results myself, as they were kept pretty confidential… you have to tell me the business reason for needing them because i’ll need that to make the case”
████: “I can guarantee I have worse shit than whatever it says lol Feed Relevance consistently distributes [Suicide and Self-Injury] vpvs to teenagers and nobody has noticed, like how much am I gonna care that deprivation studies show wellbeing gains from not using our shitty products”
████: “I once saw Policy outright state that they wouldn’t take down the account of a Cameroonian expatriate with a massive in-country following who was explicitly calling for the murder of Ambazonians who participated in the Cameroonian elections – which then absolutely happened, we saw the videos – because of the PR implications. I think folks are overestimating how bad the research evidence is vs the actual practice of working at this company.”
████: “I think the radical move is that the team’s vision should be to move IG out of the position of being uniquely worst for teens’ social comparison and body image.”
████: “It’s the only social media app that’s consistently placed into the ‘high effect on feeling bad about myself’”
████: “~2k FB accounts per day are making a DOB change where they explicitly check a box confirming they are <13 before saving (but we don’t lock them out/checkpoint them - just throw an error). This is a major [Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act] risk for us to keep them active, as it constitutes explicit knowledge of U13.”
[Unattributed]: “I would be strongly supportive of the pause on approving beautification effects into the Spark [Augmented Reality] platform while that review is underway. We are in a very bad place attempting to defend this, especially for young teenage girls who are the primary audience of these filters”
Sheryl Sandberg: "If these are the right things to do, we should not need an article to push us to do them. We have reviewed our policies and enforcement in areas like this over and over with this in mind - and then we always find more to do. I am really alarmed by this. We absolutely have to solve this problem. In obvious areas of concern (guns, opiots, harm, etc) we should be ahead of all of this... we should be able to find things before any journalist or kid on our platform."
Guy Rosen: "the best way to review is to bring the integrity maturity framework from the last H1/H2 review, which shows our level of readiness across integrity problems and the prioritization of work. While I'd love to say we have no open risks, there's enough at 'risk' maturity to keep me up at night (especially as we look across the family of apps) - and we should have our eyes wide open."
Guy Rosen: "The [Suicide and Self-Injury] thing is hard and thrashy :(... I saw Adam this morning, his takeaway from that is that we are not aligned with experts that much. De facto we are doing bad tihngs like leaving it up and discoverable and no one thinks that's good"
Monika Bickert: "Well, the discoverability thing is REALLY bad. There is no question that they need to fix that. But that's not our policies. They should be blocking the heck out of those hashtags... And the way IG displays stuff in search definitely violates our policies"
Guy Rosen: "Instagram suicide and self-injury (SSI) issues reveal we are behind where we need to be... because content outside of promotion did not violate our policies, we had no detection or enforcement in place at all for any other content, and most worryingly the content was easy to discover through search, hashtags, IG Explore, etc... We also really need to build proactive detection for content... To me, this is a painful lesson on what we mean when we say areas are at 'risk' in our maturity framework. Why was SSI in this state?... it's painful to see the gap we left."
Nick Clegg: "my central concern is that we don't have a simple, human answer to why IG carried harrowing self harm images that no reasonable person think should have appeared, and which seem to serve no self-help purpose whatsoever."
Monika Bickert: "Yes; I don't mean you should say this externally. I am just setting expectations internally that my team can't execute on most of this stuff — it is about tech resources. We wouldn't say this externally either, but probably the two biggest answers to your question are these: 1. Search results on IG return sensitive topics AND give no captions 2. No proactive classifier running."
Ronan Bradley: "The most significant risk, if this leaks, is that we will face significant policy pressure to use techniques like this, even if imperfect, to enforce age restrictions on Facebook & Messenger. If the pressure got high enough, which is possible, we might have to pro-actively try to identify and then remove everyone under 13 from Facebook & Messenger."
Alison Lee: "[I] was dismayed that it felt like Adam's response was that we were 'doing enough,' going as far as to question 'how much is enough to invest into integrity?'… we've repeatedly had to put p1 improvements like precision tuning on a number of integrity areas to correct for over/under-enforcement (including body positivity?? which he used as what felt like defense against [Negative Social Comparison]), comments integrity, age-related recommendation tuning, and rabbitholing engineering on the back burner because we're so deeply understaffed… because our p0 as a team is just to keep basic integrity and non-rec content from surging and foundational engineering improvements, and we're 4 [headcount] short (and really, we need 8 more engineers and at least 1 more researcher)… so to hear adam wonder out loud, 'how much is ever enough?' was frankly a huge disappointment"
Alison Lee: "idk what problem it was supposed to solve but the idea was to centralize all the teams to make it harder for people to leak stuff??"
Alison Lee: "it doesn't deliver on their intentions, and the reality is that it feels like censorship, removal of agency, and sends the message that our work (and expertise) is seen as a liability rather than an asset"
Maxwell: "I had really hoped the leaks would demonstrate the weight of integrity research and it's importance ... I think it has for some, but others it's just motivated to cover their asses"
Antigone Davis: "FB allows pedophiles to find eachother and kids via social graph with easy transition to Messenger. [WhatsApp] does not make it easy to make social connections, meaning making Messenger [end-to-end encryption] will be far, far worse than anything we have seen/gotten a glimpse of on [WhatsApp]."
████: “My takeaway was that if we want product leadership to prioritize wellbeing product changes we have to come up with a killer statistic. (That seems both simple and hard.)”
████: “and for some problems, probably impossible”
████: “@Justin, I think some of our descriptive stats from the body image survey could potentially be enough to change the conversation”
████: “was this ‘girl teens being 32x more likely to get unsolicited sex talk on IG compared to FB’ the main example?”
████: “I think this was the number of teens who had a DM/Messenger thread with a ‘sketchy’ adult. So on IG there were 32x as many of these threads in the US than on FB.”
████: “I think it’s sex-talk between adult and minor, from a prior conversation I had with Nino”
████: “I had some convesations [sic] with the child safety team when I was working on age affinity. It’s low prevalence, but extremely high intensity/risk/damaging”
████: “The investigator I talked to at FB was the saddest person I’ve ever met. Seriously, it was heart breaking.”
Nick Clegg: “Hey – just wondering how we can follow up on the conversation in SG this morning re the case for further wellbeing research? It seems to me we need to significantly accelerate our existing plans… Mark seems open to us doing this now so we should move quickly before the winds change.”
Adam Mosseri: “FYI I’m really worried about this. It’s going to be incredibly hard to get done. We don’t have full board alignment and the privacy and legal hurdles are significant. We’ve been talking about this for a long time but have made little progress.”
Emily Dalton Smith: “Our biggest gap is getting this research into product roadmaps. We got 0 new Well-being funding for 2022, so we’ll need to tee up the tradeoffs against other priorities.”
████: “this sounds eerily similar to what tobacco companies and climate change deniers say… when we use language like this it puts us in very bad company”
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What the documents show
Four narratives
Excerpts are tagged to one or more narratives. Follow any into the evidence.
Knowledge
They were told, and told again
Meta learned this from every direction at once: its own internal research, the outside science it reviewed, the experts it consulted, its own users telling it directly, and years of public reporting. The knowledge didn’t arrive once and get missed. It arrived repeatedly, through every channel a company has.
I would urge us to think again about why we are allowing [suicide and self-injury] imagery to stay up — it is truly horrific.
Youth Targeting
Kids were the growth strategy
Children, tweens, teenagers: Meta pursued each in turn, and named them that way internally. It built new products for the youngest and retuned its flagship apps for the rest, set acquisition targets by school grade, and recruited kids to bring in their friends and younger siblings. Its own research told it which developmental weaknesses to design for.
“The young ones are the best ones.” You want to bring people to your service young and early.
Profits over Safety
It wasn’t overlooked. It was declined.
A 13-year-old was worth roughly $270 in lifetime value, and Meta did the arithmetic. Funding and headcount for well-being were requested and refused. Features that would have protected teens — private accounts by default, hidden Likes, time-away tools — were killed, weakened or made opt-in because they cost engagement. Detection and enforcement went unbuilt or unmaintained. Each of these was a decision, with the cost written down.
I don’t see us funding [the Well-Being 10x initiative] from Instagram any time soon.
Concealment
The gap was managed
The gap between what Meta knew and what Meta said was managed at every stage. Questions went unasked, because asking would create an obligation to act. Words like “addiction” were kept out of internal documents. Research that came out badly went unpublished. And the numbers reported publicly were shaped by how they would look.
This lack of connection between what we commit to publicly and what we do internally really worried, and slightly shocked, me.
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What Meta executives told Congress, question by question, including written responses submitted after the hearings.
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The litigation this evidence comes from: the federal MDL, the state court JCCP, and state attorney general suits.
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"Emphasis on driving time spent. During H1, we will approach major moments(Awards Show, Olympics, etc.) with an explicit goal around moving time spent. We will support our company-wide time spent goals by supporting initiatives around Video, Live Events, and Ranked Feed."
Emily Eckert: "Our vertical model is working well. With a larger team, we are expanding to new verticals and deepening our focus in top markets." …
Emily Eckert and names withheld in filing
Youth TargetingProfits over Safety
Sheryl Sandberg: "Leaked research showed that 'Hiding Likes' had no effect on wellbeing, but we did it anyway for PR."
Sheryl, …
Name withheld in filing
Concealment
"1/50 pieces of content was 'age appropriate nutritious' or the sort of content we would like to promote to teens. This should also suggest that we have a big hill to climb on ensuring a higher % of a teen content consumption diet is 'nutritious'."
████: "IG and CI teams recently collaborated to outline the policy violating harm IG teens are exposed to. These results are summarized in the doc... …
Names withheld in filing
Knowledge
Where this comes from
The material here is drawn from unsealed discovery exhibits and complaints in MDL 3047 (N.D. Cal.), New Mexico v. Meta and Tennessee v. Meta, and from congressional hearing transcripts and written responses.
Each excerpt carries a source label distinguishing internal documents, testimony, court rulings, press reports and filings by either party. A filing’s allegations are not findings of fact. About the sources and methodology →