Congressional Hearing Q&A

QuestionAsks, as a parent, whether he worries about social media addiction among teens.

ResponseSays Meta studies well-being effects and distinguishes positive, relationship-building use -- linked to long-term happiness -- from passive consumption, which can be harmful.

QuestionAsks what technology identifies warning signs someone may misuse a gun, and whether such cases are reported to police.

ResponseSays Meta uses AI to flag early warning signs like gun violence and self-harm, and refers cases to law enforcement.

QuestionAsks why repeat engagement or platform addiction is harmful to individuals or society, including any economic costs.

ResponseSays quality of interaction matters more than raw engagement, and describes efforts to encourage active participation over passive scrolling.

QuestionAsks what engagement techniques platforms use, which are harmful vs. harmless, and whether industry standards exist.

ResponseSays quality of interaction matters more than time spent, cites News Feed/comments changes and “time spent” tools, and notes Facebook's support for the CAMRA Act studying tech's impact on children and adolescents.

QuestionAsks what manipulation techniques platforms use and whether industry standards exist.

ResponseDenies intent to manipulate users, points to “Why Am I Seeing This?” and data-transparency tools, reiterates CAMRA Act support.

QuestionAsks whether “healthy engagement” should be defined differently for children.

ResponseDescribes the 13+ age minimum, age-gating and search-removal safeguards for 13-17 year olds, the Parent/Youth Portal, the National PTA partnership, and Messenger Kids (built with COPPA and parental controls in mind).

QuestionAsks when platform engagement becomes addiction and how it compares to other forms of addiction.

ResponseCites academic/clinical partnerships on well-being, CAMRA Act support, a $1M research pledge on media technology and youth development, and time-management tools (activity dashboard, daily reminder, notification limits).

QuestionAsks how platforms monetize repeat engagement/addiction and why the model benefits them.

ResponseDenies Facebook is designed to be addictive, describes the ad-supported free-service model.

QuestionAsks what tools exist for users to curb repeat engagement/addiction and whether companies should fund them.

ResponseLists time-management and content-control tools (activity dashboard, daily reminder, See First/Hide/Unfollow, “You're All Caught Up,” keyword filtering) and cites the 2019 Global Safety and Well-Being Summit.

QuestionAsks what role Congress should play in combating platform addiction.

ResponseWelcomes congressional involvement in research funding, reiterates CAMRA Act support.

QuestionAsks which manipulative techniques should count as unfair/deceptive under the FTC Act, and specifically what should be allowed for adults but not children.

ResponsePoints to existing FTC Act guidance and says Facebook follows it; does not directly answer the adults-vs-children question.

QuestionAsks whether Section 230 enables increased manipulation/addiction and what fixes might address that.

ResponseSays Section 230 is what enables Facebook to proactively restrict harmful content, denies it enables manipulation.

QuestionArgues Congress should ban targeted/behavioral advertising directed at children under 13 under a federal privacy law.

ResponseCites restricted privacy settings and ad limits for minors, and says Meta doesn't collect data or target ads to under-13 users.

QuestionCites growing medical evidence of social media's addictive nature and asks if the product can be addictive.

ResponseDenies designing the product to be addictive, says the research isn't conclusive, but calls it an area Meta studies.

QuestionAsks whether Meta has internal research or evidence showing its platforms can be addictive.

ResponseSays internal research is inconclusive and most users don't experience the service as addictive, but supports giving users more control tools.

QuestionAsks how Facebook defines and measures 'meaningful' engagement and what research supports that framing.

ResponseSays the News Feed team isn't given time-spent goals and instead focuses on the value delivered to people.

QuestionAsks whether Facebook's data can show any correlation between teen girls' platform use and depression, anxiety, or self-harm.

Response"No."

Response"No."

Response"No.”

QuestionCites studies showing algorithms promote divisive, hateful content because it boosts engagement, and asks what's being done to fix it.

ResponseDisputes that the goal is keeping people on the service, saying the aim is meaningful social interactions.

QuestionCraig describes a specific incident where Facebook took down a colleague's trans-flag video as hate speech while leaving up another member's transphobic video, asks Zuckerberg to confirm the facts and whether the disparate enforcement seems right, and asks whether he'd support a mandatory Office of Civil Rights reporting to the CEO.

ResponseZuckerberg says he's unaware of the specific trans-flag/transphobic-video incident, agrees the described disparate enforcement doesn't "seem right" in the abstract but won't confirm the specifics, acknowledges content-moderation mistakes happen and Meta won't ever be "perfect," and cites hiring a VP of civil rights rather than committing to a CEO-reporting Office of Civil Rights.

QuestionEshoo asks, as a yes/no question, whether Zuckerberg will commit to redesigning Meta's products to eliminate their focus on "addicting users to your platforms at all costs" for ad-revenue purposes.

ResponseZuckerberg does not give a yes or no answer and is repeatedly cut off before completing a substantive response; Eshoo concludes his non-answer amounts to "no."

QuestionAccuses him of profiting by hooking users to the platform and asks if he agrees the product is designed to create addiction.

Response"Congressman, no. I don’t agree with that.”

QuestionAsks whether kids commonly lie about their age to bypass the 13+ rule, and whether under-13s can currently use Instagram.

ResponseAcknowledges kids lie about age, describes detection systems and an explored under-13 service with parental controls, and confirms current policy still bars under-13 use.

QuestionLatta recounts the Amanda Todd case — a 15-year-old who died by suicide after being harassed with illegal images of herself shared on Facebook — and repeatedly asks, as a yes/no question, whether Facebook bears any responsibility for her death.

ResponseZuckerberg never gives a yes/no answer on Facebook's responsibility for Amanda Todd's death specifically, instead speaking generally about the company's AI/content-moderation investment in child exploitation content.

QuestionLatta asks what specific Section 230 reforms Zuckerberg supports, given his testimony citing child exploitation as a category platforms should be held accountable for, and presses on transparency-reporting frequency.

ResponseZuckerberg proposes two Section 230 changes for large platforms: mandatory transparency reports on harmful-content prevalence (naming child exploitation and terrorism as example categories), and conditioning immunity on having effective systems to moderate clearly illegal content like sex trafficking and child exploitation.

QuestionChallenges the consistency between discouraging passive screen time and designing to increase it, and asks if the goal is maximizing time on-platform.

ResponseSays algorithms target meaningful interactions, not maximizing time spent, and that teams aren't given time-spent goals.

QuestionMcKinley confronts Zuckerberg with fresh staff-identified examples of oxycodone, Ritalin, Xanax, and Adderall being sold on Instagram — three years after Zuckerberg apologized for the same problem on Facebook — and repeatedly asks whether Zuckerberg should be held personally liable, comparing it to liability for retailers selling cigarettes to minors and manufacturers held liable for the opioid crisis.

ResponseZuckerberg does not answer the personal-liability question directly, instead arguing that at Meta's scale it's inevitable some illegal-drug-sale content will be missed (comparing it to a police force that can't stop every crime), and pushes back on the characterization that Meta is "studying the problem" rather than acting.

Question"Do you believe that your platform harms children?"

ResponseSays he doesn't believe the platform harms children, citing design goals around well-being and connection and the under-13 ban.

QuestionReferring to anti-Asian-hate-associated hashtags (e.g. COVID-origin slurs) circulating on social platforms, Matsui asks why Facebook still allows them and presses Zuckerberg specifically for comment after Dorsey answers.

ResponseZuckerberg calls anti-Asian hate a priority issue and says Facebook removes hateful hashtag content that violates its hate speech policy.

QuestionUpton asks what resources Meta devotes to combating illegal drug sales on its platforms, given the practice remains a problem despite violating policy.

ResponseZuckerberg cites over 1,000 engineers on AI "integrity systems" and 35,000+ content reviewers, and frames illegal-drug-sale content as a case where large platforms should be expected to build effective moderation systems.

QuestionCiting initial reports that the Boulder, Colorado mass-shooting suspect had been bullied, including online, Upton asks what process exists for parents/families to pursue anti-bullying efforts on Meta's platforms, and what changes to Section 230 Zuckerberg would suggest.

ResponseZuckerberg says bullying content is often not clearly illegal, making it a key example for why Section 230 reform is needed beyond just illegal content, and frames "stop[ping] people from bullying children" as one of Meta's primary use cases for that broader moderation authority; reiterates his three-part Section 230 reform proposal.

QuestionAsks how a proposed free under-13 service would monetize users, whether it targets children, and if he'd let his own kids use it.

ResponseSays Meta is still early in exploring the under-13 service concept and currently doesn't allow under-13 use.

QuestionCastor cites the documentary "The Social Dilemma," a 2019 JAMA pediatric study linking adolescent depression risk to social media hours, and 2019 HHS research on rising suicide rates among 10-to-14-year-olds, asking whether Zuckerberg is aware of each, and whether he's aware of research linking self-harm hospitalizations to addictive app design.

ResponseZuckerberg says he hasn't seen "The Social Dilemma" but is "obviously familiar" with the JAMA study's general subject, says he's not aware of the specific HHS suicide-rate research, and gives no response at all to the final self-harm-hospitalizations question — the official transcript marks it "[No response.]" — before Castor moves on to Pichai.

Question"Mr. Zuckerberg, how much advertising revenue does Facebook— do you make from behavioral surveillance advertising targeted towards kids under age 13?”

Response"Congresswoman, it should be none of it. We don’t allow children under the age of 13—On the services that run advertising."

Question"[A]re you saying that there are no kids on Instagram under the age of 13 right now?"

Response"Congresswoman, children under the age of 13 are not allowed on Instagram. When we find out that they are there we remove them."

QuestionCiting her DETOUR Act targeting "dark patterns" — deceptive interface tactics used to extract personal data — Blunt Rochester asks whether Zuckerberg would oppose legislation banning such manipulative design, and whether he'll commit to including deceptive design choices in Meta's own internet-regulation proposals.

ResponseZuckerberg says the anti-dark-patterns principle "makes sense" but declines to commit, saying he'd need to think about it and that other regulatory areas feel more urgent to him.

QuestionFletcher asks whether a federal legal standard for defining domestic terror/hate organizations, similar to the State Department's foreign-terrorist-organization designation, would help Meta better track and remove harmful domestic content.

ResponseZuckerberg says he's not sure a federal standard is needed, noting Meta already classifies domestic white-supremacist organizations, militias, and QAnon-linked networks at the same severity level as foreign terrorist organizations.

QuestionTrahan describes manipulative, attention-capturing design features in kids' apps like Messenger Kids and the reported Instagram for Kids, and asks Zuckerberg directly whether the planned Instagram for Kids will include endless scroll and beautifying filters, plus how he'll personally handle his own children craving screen time over face-to-face interaction.

ResponseZuckerberg says Instagram for Kids' design (including whether it will have endless scroll or beautifying filters) is not yet finalized, and points to Messenger Kids' parent-controlled model as the template being considered.

QuestionCiting NCMEC CyberTipline data showing Facebook responsible for 20.3 million child-exploitation reports (far more than Google, Twitter, or MindGeek), Griffith asks, yes or no, whether Facebook has a child exploitation problem on its platform.

ResponseZuckerberg attributes Facebook's high NCMEC report volume to proactive over-flagging rather than a uniquely high rate of child exploitation content, arguing high report numbers should be seen as evidence of diligence rather than criticized.

QuestionAsks about the 2.5 million suicide/self-injury posts removed in Q4 2020 and what policies expanded reviewer capacity over time.

ResponseSays AI now identifies roughly 98-99% of hate speech, terrorist content, and suicide-related content Meta removes.

QuestionCiting the El Paso and Atlanta mass shootings as examples of hate-fueled violence linked to online content, Cárdenas asks whether Zuckerberg believes Meta has done enough to combat the spread of hatred and incitement to violence on its platforms.

ResponseZuckerberg says Meta has done more than any other company but acknowledges the problem persists and more needs to be done.

QuestionClarke asks why Facebook continues to allow racially discriminatory ad targeting despite past updates to its "special ad audience" tools.

ResponseZuckerberg cites steps taken to eliminate racial-affinity ad targeting and ongoing consultation with civil rights experts.

QuestionNotes research shows emotional and misinformation content is more engaging, and asks how that squares with claims users don't want it.

ResponseSays pushing extreme content isn't in Facebook's long-term interest since unhappy or angry users are less likely to return.

QuestionSchakowsky asks how Facebook will create recourse channels to prevent systematic over-flagging of benign minority-community content (citing the Sikh community specifically) as hate speech.

ResponseFacebook acknowledges it "sometimes incorrectly" flags benign minority-community content as hate speech, and points to its general appeals process ("Request Review"/"Disagree with Decision") rather than any Sikh-community-specific fix.

QuestionCiting that over 15% of youth social media users experience cyberbullying, with minority youth receiving disproportionately more vitriolic messages, Schakowsky asks what recourse Facebook provides at the intersection of cyberbullying and racial/ethnic hate speech.

ResponseFacebook confirms its Bullying and Harassment and Hate Speech policies apply, and specifically states it provides "heightened protections for users between the ages of 13 and 18" because bullying can have more emotional impact on minors, without addressing the specific racial-disparity data cited in the question.

QuestionSchakowsky asks Zuckerberg to detail whether Facebook's algorithms and recommendation tools amplified dangerous/conspiracy content, specifically asking for a case-by-case account of Capitol riot suspects' group memberships, ad targeting, and whether Facebook's recommendations connected them to QAnon or other rioters.

ResponseFacebook declines entirely to answer the specific Capitol-rioter case questions (group membership, ad targeting, recommendation history), citing the ongoing law enforcement investigation, and instead describes its general Dangerous Organizations and Individuals policy and QAnon/militia enforcement actions.

QuestionCiting the Kenosha shooting, Schakowsky asks what Facebook will do to prevent pages calling for armed militia organizing, and how it will enforce that.

ResponseFacebook cites an August 2020 framework flagging locations at elevated risk of armed violence/intimidation (treating them like schools or polling places) and its broader militarized-social-movements ban, without directly addressing page-creation prevention.

QuestionSchakowsky asserts Facebook is failing to enforce its ban on microtargeting ads to people with disabilities, resulting in children being harmed and scammers monetizing fake cures, and asks what Facebook will commit to.

ResponseFacebook says it does not offer disability/medical-condition ad targeting and has been removing such interest categories over time, without directly addressing the specific allegation that children were harmed by microtargeted fake-cure ads.

QuestionSchakowsky asks how much ad revenue Facebook generated from QAnon before banning it, whether Facebook does financial modeling of user-loss risk when making content-moderation decisions about militarized social movements, and whether it will share that internal analysis.

ResponseFacebook does not provide a QAnon-specific ad-revenue figure or share any financial modeling/user-loss analysis, instead asserting broadly that there is "no incentive" to keep hateful content since users and advertisers don't want to see it.

QuestionSchakowsky presses Zuckerberg to clarify whether his repeated "99%" removal-rate claims for terrorist propaganda, human trafficking, and CSAM content mean 99% of what Facebook catches, versus 99% of all such content that actually exists — noting a study finding the real removal rate may be only 25-30%.

ResponseFacebook does not directly reconcile its "99%" removal claim against the cited 25-30% study, instead pivoting to its "prevalence" methodology and reporting specific Q4 2020 upper-limit prevalence figures: terrorism content at no more than 0.07% of views, and "child nudity and sexual exploitation of children" content at no more than 0.05% of views.

QuestionCiting former Facebook policy employees who said Zuckerberg personally intervened to change the rules on banning Alex Jones and the Oath Keepers because he "didn't like the punishment," Schakowsky asks what role Zuckerberg personally plays in content-removal decisions.

ResponseFacebook confirms both bans eventually happened and that Zuckerberg is "ultimately responsible" for major decisions as company leader, but does not directly address or deny the specific allegation that he personally intervened to soften an earlier punishment for Alex Jones.

QuestionCiting 2016 Facebook research finding 64% of people who joined extremist Facebook groups did so via Facebook's own recommendation tools, and Zuckerberg's earlier Senate-hearing non-answer ("I'm not familiar with that specific study"), Schakowsky asks whether he's now familiar with it and whether extremist-group recruitment via recommendations declined after policy changes.

ResponseFacebook characterizes the 64% statistic as tied to a narrower 2017 Germany-specific issue that was "addressed at the time," denies ever having "buried research," but does not directly state whether extremist-group recruitment via Facebook's recommendation tools declined since the policy changes, as specifically asked.

QuestionSchakowsky asks why and how the #Sikh and #Sikhism hashtags were repeatedly blocked in 2020, and whether the blocks were automated or human-driven.

ResponseFacebook confirms the block was caused by a human review error, took nearly three months to catch (March 7 to June 3, 2020), and apologizes, without detailing what specific process changes were made to prevent recurrence.

QuestionSchakowsky asks whether white supremacist/racist hate content is inherently harder to moderate than COVID/vaccine misinformation, given Facebook touted success on the latter while the former "runs rampant."

ResponseFacebook does not directly answer whether hate content is "inherently more difficult" to police than health misinformation, instead citing general hate-speech enforcement statistics (97%+ pre-report detection, 0.07-0.08% prevalence in Q4 2020).

QuestionRice asks how Facebook's content-moderation methods differ between misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech (following its policy shift reclassifying Holocaust denial as hate speech rather than misinformation), and how it should be held accountable given an ADL study still finding significant Holocaust denial content on the platform.

ResponseFacebook explains its terminology distinctions (misinformation vs. disinformation vs. hate speech) and cites general hate-speech enforcement statistics, but does not directly address the ADL's finding that significant Holocaust denial content persists despite the policy change, nor propose a specific accountability mechanism.

QuestionCiting the pattern of YouTube Kids users migrating to the main YouTube platform, Trahan asks whether Messenger Kids usage has led to an increase in under-13 monthly active users across Facebook's other apps.

ResponseFacebook denies Messenger Kids automatically feeds into a Facebook account at 13, describes its age-verification approach (self-reported birthdate, user reports, AI age-estimation tools), and argues that kids-specific apps like Messenger Kids actually reduce the incentive for children to lie about their age to access the main platform — without directly answering whether under-13 monthly active users increased.

QuestionCiting leaked 2017 internal documents describing Facebook's ability to monitor young people's posts and photos in real time to detect emotional states like feeling "stressed," "worthless," "useless," and a "failure," Trahan asks how many projects have gone through Facebook's subsequently-announced "enhanced review" process for sensitive/age-specific research, and whether that process has been independently audited.

ResponseFacebook says the 2017 "insecure/worthless teens" research violated its own internal review processes at the time and was never used for ad targeting, describes its post-2017 enhanced-review framework in general terms, but does not answer either specific question asked — how many projects have gone through enhanced review since 2017, or whether that process has been independently audited.

QuestionCiting an ADL survey showing only 14% of reported physical-threat content actually gets deleted (down from 22% the year before), Kelly asks why Facebook isn't investing more in moderation and protecting harassment targets.

ResponseFacebook cites its rising bullying/harassment enforcement volume (3.5M to 6.3M pieces of content quarter-over-quarter) and proactive-detection-rate improvement (26.4% to 48.8%), without directly addressing the specific 14%-of-physical-threats-removed statistic from the ADL survey.

QuestionCiting the 2018 Fair Housing Act allegations that Facebook's ad-targeting systems let advertisers exclude audiences by race, gender, and zip code, Clarke asks whether Facebook still maintains its Section 230 civil-rights-immunity legal position, and what it's doing about discriminatory ad targeting generally.

ResponseFacebook does not directly answer whether it still holds its Section 230 civil-rights-immunity legal position, but describes having eliminated age/gender/zip-code targeting for housing, employment, and credit ads specifically, following settlements with civil rights groups.

QuestionFollowing up on Hawley's revenue-from-teens questions, Klobuchar asks whether Meta can provide a teen-specific breakdown of its $51.58/user quarterly ad revenue figure, and whether that figure is company-wide or Facebook-only.

ResponseSatterfield says no teen-specific revenue breakdown exists beyond the general average-revenue-per-user figure, which is company-wide (not Instagram-specific).

QuestionHawley asks point-blank whether teenagers are currently safe on Meta's platforms, pressing when Satterfield answers only in future/aspirational terms.

ResponseSatterfield answers only in terms of ongoing investment ("working really hard," "billions of dollars") rather than directly confirming teens are currently safe.

QuestionHawley reads a series of internal Meta research quotes on Instagram worsening teen girls' body image, anxiety, depression, and social comparison, and asks Satterfield to respond.

ResponseSatterfield doesn't dispute the quotes, again deflects to "not my area," and says Meta has teams working on body image/well-being.

QuestionHawley repeatedly asks whether Meta will make its internal teen-harm research public.

ResponseSatterfield repeatedly declines to commit to releasing the research, citing confidentiality as necessary for "free and frank" internal discussion, while saying Meta is "looking into" greater transparency.

QuestionHawley asks how much revenue Meta derives from Instagram and specifically from teen/addicted users, accuses the company of prioritizing profit over disclosure, and asks Meta to commit to suspending development of Instagram Kids (targeting under-13s).

ResponseSatterfield says he doesn't know Instagram's or teens' specific revenue figures, and rather than committing to suspend Instagram Kids, says Meta wants tweens (who are "online" regardless) to have a good, healthy experience.

QuestionHawley sarcastically asks whether the "healthy" tween experience Satterfield described is like the harmful one teen girls are currently having, per the just-cited research.

ResponseSatterfield doesn't engage the specific comparison, repeating that teen safety/well-being is Meta's top priority.

Question"You’re stonewalling every Member of this Committee. What about this? Will you at least commit to keeping behavioral advertising out of any product that a kid can access?"

ResponseSays advertising is valuable but cites changes limiting advertisers' ability to reach under-18 users.

QuestionHawley sums up the exchange, listing what Meta wouldn't commit to, and asks Satterfield to confirm or correct the summary.

ResponseSatterfield disputes the framing without correcting any specific point, repeating that Meta will keep dialoguing with Congress and investing.

QuestionHawley asks why Meta should be permitted to advertise to teenagers at all, and why Congress shouldn't simply prohibit it.

ResponseSatterfield defends continuing to advertise to teens as necessary to "support" the service, citing unspecified "additional protections" already in place.

QuestionCiting whistleblower-sourced data, Blackburn asks whether Meta's extensive tracking/data collection on teens ("a virtual you") violates COPPA, and who the third-party experts are that Meta claims to consult on teen protections.

ResponseSatterfield denies any COPPA violation and claims Meta consults "third-party experts," but cannot name them, again citing it as outside his own area of work.

QuestionPressing on Satterfield's VP title, Blackburn asks whether he's really uninvolved in teen-data privacy decisions, and whether Meta plans to use data from its own teen mental-health survey to build new protections.

ResponseSatterfield reverses his earlier "not my area" position, confirming he is involved in teen privacy issues, and says the teen mental-health survey data "informs decision-making" without committing to specific resulting protections.

QuestionBlackburn accuses Meta of using teen data to drive profit rather than child welfare, and asks Satterfield to state on the record what the data is actually used for.

ResponseSatterfield reiterates the data is used "to improve their experience," without further specifics before being cut off by Blackburn's next question.

QuestionCiting teens who said they now advise younger siblings to avoid Instagram, Blackburn asks whether Meta uses teen survey/behavioral data for micro-targeted advertising or to algorithmically push more of the same content to users.

ResponseSatterfield gives a general answer about improving the service, without confirming or denying the specific micro-targeting/content-amplification uses Blackburn asked about.

QuestionBlackburn asks Satterfield to name three concrete improvements Meta has made to keep teens healthier and safer.

ResponseSatterfield cites changes to adult-to-minor contact restrictions, comment moderation, anti-bullying measures, and well-being/body-image resources.

QuestionBlackburn presses on whether Meta's improvements are substantive or superficial, specifically asking whether it will stop human/sex/drug traffickers from using its platforms, and cites a Mexican drug cartel that remained active on Facebook.

ResponseSatterfield says there's no place on Facebook for trafficking activity and claims the specific cartel organization referenced in the WSJ article was designated and banned.

QuestionCompares current revelations to the tobacco industry's historical concealment of known harms.

ResponseSays the issues are self-identified through internal research meant to make the platform safer.

QuestionBlumenthal asks why Meta misrepresented its Instagram/teen-mental-health research when responding to a Blumenthal/Blackburn letter, why it concealed the research, whether more such research exists, and why the company claimed to be "not aware" of harms it actually knew about.

ResponseSatterfield disputes the "misrepresented" characterization but doesn't rebut the underlying facts, says Meta keeps research confidential to "encourage free and frank discussion," claims not to be aware of other teen-harm research since he personally works on privacy rather than well-being, and says he isn't familiar with the specific letter Blumenthal/Blackburn sent.

QuestionCiting Nick Clegg's "nascent and evolving" characterization and Meta's own research finding 13% of British and 6% of American users traced suicidal ideation to Instagram, Blumenthal asks why this isn't misleading and presses for an explanation.

ResponseSatterfield defends Clegg's "nascent and evolving" characterization as accurate and offers only a commitment to "work with" Blumenthal's staff, without addressing the specific 13%/6% suicidal-ideation statistics.

QuestionBlumenthal asks whether Meta's own research ever found Instagram more harmful to teens than competing platforms.

ResponseSatterfield says he's not aware of such research, again citing that teen-harm issues aren't his area, and offers to follow up.

QuestionCiting the WSJ's "Facebook Knows Instagram Is Toxic For Teen Girls" article and its internal research slides (1-in-3 body image, anxiety/depression, 13%/6% suicidal-ideation-traced-to-Instagram statistics), Cruz asks whether Mark Zuckerberg personally knew about this research, and whether Satterfield — as VP of privacy and public policy — knew about it himself.

ResponseSatterfield doesn't know whether Zuckerberg personally knew about the research, says he himself only became familiar with it through the WSJ article (not before), and disputes only the general characterization that Meta's products are "unsafe."

QuestionCruz asks whether Satterfield inquired before testifying about whether Zuckerberg knew of the research, whether that falls within his job purview given his title, and then repeatedly presses — as yes/no questions — whether Meta's own research actually concluded the body-image and suicidal-ideation statistics being discussed.

ResponseSatterfield never gives a direct yes/no confirmation of either the body-image or suicidal-ideation research conclusions, repeatedly citing attorney-client prep discussions and his own lack of subject-matter responsibility, and offers only to arrange a briefing.

QuestionCruz asks whether increased teen suicide is an "acceptable business risk" for Meta, whether Meta has quantified additional teen deaths attributable to its products, and what Satterfield would say to a parent who lost a teenage daughter.

ResponseSatterfield says increased teen suicide is not an acceptable business risk, declines to address whether deaths have been quantified (citing his role again), and offers only a general expression of personal concern as a parent.

QuestionCruz asks — repeatedly, as Satterfield keeps getting cut off — what Meta actually changed as a result of the 2019 research, two years before this hearing.

ResponseSatterfield never names a single specific change made in response to the 2019 research, repeatedly offering only to arrange a staff briefing.

QuestionAsks for the estimated lifetime value of underage users and whether profit was ever a factor in related product decisions.

ResponseSays decisions for young users focus on parental tools and better experience, not profit calculus, while acknowledging Meta is a business.

Question"Does Facebook have any internal estimates within the last 18 months of how many kids under 13 have accounts on any or all of its services, excluding Messenger Kids?"

ResponseSays Meta has limited data on underage users since they're barred by policy, and removes them once identified.

QuestionAsks when and how Meta's safety head first learned of internal research on body image and teen mental health.

ResponseSays her team works closely with researchers on an ongoing basis to understand and improve teens' platform experiences.

QuestionAsks when Meta's safety head learned that internal research found Instagram worsens body image for one in three teen girls, and what she did about it.

ResponseClarifies the finding applied to girls who already had the issue, confirms she knew, and cites resulting changes like a dedicated eating-disorder reporting flow.

QuestionKlobuchar presses on who specifically will decide whether to "unpause" the paused Instagram-for-kids-under-13 project, and by what criteria.

ResponseDavis never names a decision-maker or criteria; says it will be a "collaborative team" guided by youth advisors, parents, and policymakers.

QuestionKlobuchar asks whether Facebook's reported $51/quarter ad-revenue-per-user figure includes Instagram, and specifically revenue from users under 18.

ResponseDavis says it's not her area, doesn't answer whether the figure includes Instagram/under-18 revenue; says Facebook has "always limited" ads to young people.

QuestionKlobuchar follows up in writing on who decides whether/when to unpause Instagram Kids, what criteria will be used, who Facebook is consulting, and whether the Board has a role.

ResponseFacebook names Adam Mosseri (Head of Instagram) as the one who will ultimately decide whether to resume Instagram Kids, in consultation with Meta leadership — directly answering, in writing, the "who decides" question Davis repeatedly declined to answer live.

QuestionKlobuchar asks for a per-platform breakdown of ad revenue per user, and specifically how much comes from users under 18.

ResponseFacebook declines to provide a platform-level or under-18 revenue breakdown, citing only its already-public aggregate ARPU/ARPP figures.

QuestionCiting an internal document calling tweens "a valuable but untapped audience," Klobuchar asks why 10-12 year olds are valuable to Facebook, what the lifetime value of an under-13 user is, and for copies of any internal financial-value analyses of young users presented to officers/directors.

ResponseFacebook doesn't answer why tweens specifically are valuable beyond generic "understanding how teens use technology"; says it doesn't calculate lifetime value for (the nominally-forbidden) under-13 Messenger Kids users; and declines to provide the requested internal financial-value analyses or say whether any were presented to officers/directors.

QuestionKlobuchar asks for the Facebook-specific (not just Instagram) under-13 account removal count, and who is ultimately responsible for under-13 account-removal policy.

ResponseFacebook gives the 2.6M Facebook / 850K Instagram removal figures and describes its age-estimation AI methodology (including the "Happy 21st Bday" signal-detection approach); does not name a single individual with ultimate responsibility, instead describing a distributed policy team/process.

QuestionCiting a specific reported example (a 13-year-old test account being algorithmically fed pro-eating-disorder accounts like "I have to be thin"), Klobuchar asks how the recommendation algorithm produces that result, what's been done to remove such accounts, who's ultimately responsible, and what specific actions followed the news reports.

ResponseFacebook doesn't directly explain the algorithmic mechanism that surfaced the pro-eating-disorder accounts to the test profile; describes its removal statistics, reporting tools, and the "nudges"/"Take a Break" features; names no specific individual as ultimately responsible, again pointing to a distributed team.

QuestionKlobuchar presses for specifics on what Davis personally did in response to the internal research, who helped develop any recommendations, whether they were enacted, who was responsible, whether any recommended actions were declined, and whether anyone verified the changes actually worked.

ResponseFacebook answers Q2 with a general list of product features attributed to "our research" broadly, then answers every subsequent specific question (Did she personally recommend changes? Who helped her? Were any declined? Was follow-up verification done?) by referring back to that same general answer — never naming Davis's individual role, any specific person who helped her, or confirming any verification/follow-up occurred.

Question"Has Facebook ever made internal product decisions that prioritized engagement over the potential impact on misinformation, hate speech, or violence and incitement?"

ResponseSays Facebook prioritizes meaningful over polarizing content and works to limit exposure to debunked misinformation and borderline content.

QuestionAsks yes-or-no whether Facebook ever advanced a change known to harm users because it grew usage or revenue.

Response“That has not been my experience at all at Facebook. We care deeply about the safety and security of the people on our platform.”

QuestionAsks whether Facebook or Instagram collects personally identifiable data on children under 13 without parental consent.

Response"Respectfully, Senator, we do not allow children under the age of 13—"

Response"Senator, it would be my understanding that we don’t since we don’t allow them on our apps.”

Question"Will Facebook release the basis of its research revealed in reporting by the Wall Street Journal (the datasets minus any personally identifiable information) to allow for independent analysis?"

ResponseExplains confidentiality protects candid internal debate, while citing efforts toward more transparency and continued external research publication.

QuestionLuján presses, repeatedly, for a straight yes/no on whether Facebook will release the underlying dataset (minus PII) behind its internal teen body-image research.

ResponseDavis never gives a clean yes/no; repeatedly cites privacy obligations and says Facebook is "looking to release more" without committing.

QuestionLuján asks, yes/no, whether Facebook tests algorithm changes' impact before rollout, and specifically whether it tests changes for their effect on user growth/revenue.

ResponseDavis says this isn't her area of expertise both times; doesn't confirm or deny growth/revenue-impact testing.

QuestionLuján asks, yes/no, whether Facebook tests platform changes for their effect on users' propensity toward violent/hateful language, and separately toward self-harm ideation.

ResponseDavis doesn't answer the hateful-language question directly; on self-harm, cites the ~0.5% figure of young users tracing first suicidal thoughts to the platform and describes the suicide-prevention reporting flow.

QuestionCiting whistleblower Frances Haugen's testimony that underage users are on the platform "in far greater numbers than anyone is aware," Luján asks whether Facebook will publish its underage-detection methodology.

ResponseFacebook explicitly refuses to publish the detection methodology, stating outright that detailed disclosure would give evaders a roadmap — a direct, reasoned "no" rather than a dodge.

Question"Ms. Davis, has Facebook conducted research into how children are more easily manipulated by highly personalized advertising?"

ResponseSays she isn't familiar with the cited research, but notes minors can only be targeted by age, gender, or location, and Messenger Kids under-13 has no ads.

QuestionLummis contrasts Zuckerberg's earlier congressional testimony (social apps have "positive mental health benefits") with internal research Facebook allegedly withheld, and asks directly whether Facebook is withholding negative-mental-health-impact studies.

ResponseDavis pushes back that the WSJ reporting was "one sided," cites comparable outside research (Harvard, Pew, Berkeley), and gives the "8 out of 10 report a neutral/positive experience" figure; doesn't directly answer the withholding question.

QuestionLummis asks whether Facebook uses data on the "2 out of 10" users with negative experiences to adapt its product for kids being harmed.

ResponseDavis describes the same "nudges" toward uplifting content approach mentioned elsewhere in the hearing.

Question“But isn’t part of your business model to have more eyeballs for a longer amount of time engaged using your services?”

ResponseDenies the model is about maximizing eyeballs, citing news feed changes that cut time spent by ~50M hours/day for a better experience.

QuestionPresses on exactly which claims -- addictive design or mental-health harm -- he disagrees with.

ResponseDisagrees the product is addictive, citing the time-spent dashboard, reminders, and 'take a break' feature as tools addressing parental concerns.

QuestionSullivan asks directly whether Davis was aware of the teen-suicide-statistics research, then challenges her framing that Instagram use "helps" more than harms, calling it "quite remarkable" and pressing for actual evidence.

ResponseDavis confirms awareness of teen mental health issues, repeats the "11 of 12 issues, more teens found it helpful than harmful" framing, stresses the research is not causal, and again describes the "take a break" and "nudging" features.

QuestionSullivan cites China's regulatory time-limits on teen social media/gaming use and asks whether the U.S. government should consider similar mandated limits, since he doesn't trust the industry to self-regulate.

ResponseDavis argues parental controls (not government mandates) are the right approach, and cites COVID-era connectivity benefits as a complicating factor.

QuestionCiting internal stats (32% of teen girls / 6% of teen users linking Instagram to suicidal ideation), Markey demands a yes/no commitment that Facebook won't launch under-12 platforms with popularity-quantifying features (likes, follower counts).

ResponseDavis disputes the "big tobacco" framing and does not give a yes/no commitment; says feature decisions will be made "with experts."

QuestionMarkey seeks a yes/no commitment against (1) launching kids' platforms with influencer/commercial content children can't recognize as ads, and (2) algorithms that funnel teens toward harmful content like diet-pill ads and COVID misinformation.

ResponseDavis doesn't commit yes/no; notes Messenger Kids shows no ads at all, and that weight-loss ads are already barred for under-18s.

QuestionMarkey asks Davis to commit, yes/no, to supporting his newly reintroduced KIDS Act (banning follower counts/autoplay/push alerts for kids, limiting influencer ads, prohibiting harmful-content amplification); accuses Facebook of "delay and obfuscation" when she won't.

ResponseDavis expresses general openness to "updated Internet regulations" but does not commit to supporting the specific bill.

QuestionCiting the 2014 "emotional contagion" study and recent leaks showing similar effects on teen Instagram users, Thune asks what Facebook will do to counter it.

ResponseDavis distances Facebook's research from "emotional contagion" framing specifically, but describes a planned "nudges" feature to redirect users away from negative content spirals.

QuestionChallenges research and marketing allegedly aimed at 8-12 year-olds and asks how the under-13 policy is actually enforced.

ResponseDenies marketing to 8-12 year-olds, cites 600,000 underage accounts removed in three months, and describes age-screening and reporting tools.

QuestionAsks why a test account set up as a 13-year-old immediately received eating-disorder and self-harm content, and what AI drove that.

ResponseDenies directing users to eating-disorder content, calls it a policy violation, and cites AI used to find and remove it.

QuestionCiting an internal report, Blackburn says Facebook knew about domestic-servitude/trafficking content and only acted once Apple threatened to pull the app from the App Store; asks whether young girls on the platform are exposed to it.

ResponseDavis disputes the characterization, says Facebook has anti-trafficking policies; does not directly answer the "did you know / why the delay" or child-exposure questions.

QuestionCiting a WSJ-reported internal document about future product targeting ("tweens... as young as eight"), Blackburn asks point-blank whether Facebook conducts market research on tweens, and accuses Facebook of COPPA-violating data collection on children.

ResponseDavis says the cited document is actually about an age-appropriate design code framework (referencing Sen. Markey's work), not Facebook's own market-research targeting decision; does not directly answer yes/no.

QuestionBlackburn asks what Facebook does with data from its "digital experience surveys" of kids, how long it's retained, and demands Facebook submit its parental-consent form for the record.

ResponseDavis says the most stringent privacy protections apply and parental consent is obtained, but doesn't answer the data-retention question and only agrees to "take the request back" on producing the consent form (no commitment to actually produce it).

QuestionBlackburn follows up on her live-testimony question, asking Facebook to describe its parental-consent process for research and to produce a copy of the consent form.

ResponseFacebook describes its consent process and, notably, does actually attach the requested consent form (as an exhibit to the QFR response) — unlike most other document/form requests in this hearing, which were deflected.

QuestionBlackburn asks how Facebook recruits child/teen research participants and whether it employs child psychologists or therapists for this work.

ResponseFacebook confirms it does employ researchers with clinical/developmental psychology and pediatric backgrounds (among other fields), and describes email/in-app recruitment plus a third-party parent panel for Messenger Kids research.

QuestionBlackburn asks whether data from removed underage accounts is actually deleted or retained in case of future reactivation.

ResponseFacebook says data is deleted per standard policy once an account is permanently disabled (30 days after failing an age checkpoint), though doesn't elaborate on what "standard deletion policies" actually entail (retention period, backups, etc.).

QuestionBlackburn names the specific internal report ("Apple Escalation on Domestic Servitude—how we made it through this SEV") and presses Davis to explain, in detail, why the report's own words ("absence of proactive detection") describe exactly what Davis disputed live.

ResponseFacebook does not explain "in detail what happened in this case" as asked, and doesn't address the "absence of proactive detection" language from its own report — pivots to a general description of anti-trafficking program investments instead.

QuestionCiting Frances Haugen's testimony and data shared with her office, Blackburn presses on Facebook's use of "MAPMAPMonthly Active PeopleCore Meta engagement metric counting distinct people active on a platform in a month. Paired with DAP in internal goal-setting; the MAP/DAP ratio is used as a measure of how frequently a monthly user returns.Full entry ↗" (monthly active people) to estimate the underage population — directly following up on the live-testimony "map" sub-thread from Blackburn's first round.

ResponseFacebook doesn't confirm or deny using MAPMAPMonthly Active PeopleCore Meta engagement metric counting distinct people active on a platform in a month. Paired with DAP in internal goal-setting; the MAP/DAP ratio is used as a measure of how frequently a monthly user returns.Full entry ↗ specifically to estimate the underage population (the actual question asked), instead describing its general age-detection/account-removal methodology.

QuestionAsks how much material Facebook refers to NCMEC yearly and whether the referral process needs reform.

ResponseCites zero-tolerance child exploitation policies, detection technology, and victim support resources; says no tolerance for child sexual exploitation.

Question"Does Facebook collect data—do either Facebook or Instagram collect data or assign interest of adult related material to the profiles of children using your platform?"

ResponseStates Meta bans tobacco and alcohol ads to minors and prohibits sexualization of minors on its platforms.

QuestionLee asks, yes/no, whether Facebook/Instagram allow businesses to target adult-themed ads at 13-17-year-olds.

ResponseNo clean yes/no; Davis describes the three allowed ad-targeting parameters (age, gender, location) and some prohibited categories (e.g., weight-loss ads).

QuestionLee narrows to sexually suggestive/explicit ad targeting specifically, then asks what Facebook's process is for determining which ads are age-appropriate for kids.

ResponseDavis doesn't directly confirm or deny sexually-explicit ad targeting; describes categorical ad prohibitions and offers to provide the "full list" afterward rather than in the hearing.

QuestionLee asks whether Facebook/Instagram's App Store age ratings (12+ on Apple, "Teen" on Google Play) came from Facebook itself, why there's a disparity between those ratings and the actual (sometimes exploitative/pornographic-adjacent) content available, and — pointedly — whether Davis personally believes those ratings are appropriate.

ResponseDavis says Facebook doesn't set its own App Store age rating (submits a form, the platforms assign it), doesn't say whether she thinks the ratings are appropriate, and repeatedly redirects to Apple/Google as the ones to ask.

QuestionLee confronts Davis with a specific third-party experiment (Technology Transparency Project) showing Facebook approved ads for alcohol, prescription drugs, vaping, eating-disorder tips, and dating profiles targeted at 9.1 million 13-17-year-olds — directly contradicting her live testimony that such ads aren't allowed.

ResponseFacebook concedes the ads violated its own policies and says they "ultimately did not run" (because TTP itself stopped them, not because Facebook caught them), announces a policy change restricting under-18 ad targeting to age/gender/location only going forward.

QuestionCiting Frances Haugen's testimony that Facebook's AI "only catch[es] a very tiny minority of offending content," Lee asks Davis to confirm or deny this and explain the ad-approval AI process.

ResponseDavis doesn't directly confirm or deny Haugen's "tiny minority" characterization; acknowledges enforcement "isn't perfect" and describes the automated-plus-human review process in general terms.

QuestionLee asks whether Facebook collects interest-category data on teens for adult products (tobacco, alcohol, drugs, sexual content) even when not currently serving ads against that data.

ResponseDavis doesn't give a direct yes/no on whether interest-category data (including adult-product interests) is still collected on teens even without being used for ad targeting — describes general data categories and the new under-18 ad-targeting restriction, which addresses targeting but not underlying collection.

QuestionCiting a WSJ report that an outside consultant recommended Facebook adopt a policy to not profit from trafficking-related ad revenue, Lee asks whether that policy was adopted and, if not, why not.

ResponseDavis doesn't directly confirm whether the specific "don't profit from trafficking ad revenue" policy the consultant recommended was adopted — describes general anti-trafficking policy consolidation, enforcement staffing, and support for SESTA/FOSTA legislation instead.

Question"[W]hat are you going to do to fix the problem? You are essentially saying there is no problem. Is that right?"

ResponsePoints to the 'take a break' feature meant to interrupt excessive scrolling or app use.

QuestionCites three undisclosed internal Facebook studies on teen body image/social comparison harms; presses Davis to commit to full disclosure of all research.

ResponseDavis says the research isn't causal/a "bombshell," some reports already released, cites privacy considerations for not releasing more; declines to commit to full disclosure.

QuestionBlumenthal characterizes "Finstas" (teens' secret second accounts) as a deliberate Facebook growth strategy that helps hide activity from parents and boosts monetizable engagement metrics.

ResponseDavis says Finstas were a teen-driven behavior, not a Facebook-built feature, and points to upcoming parental supervisory tools as evidence Facebook isn't hiding teen activity.