Gabriel ████:
"(l) Yes on PYMKPYMKPeople You May KnowFacebook's friend-recommendation surface. Appears in the archive chiefly in child-safety contexts, as a vector by which adult accounts are recommended to minors.Full entry ↗, but with the specifics of
a/ MaCSA>0.3 to Minor: Filtered
b/ Minor to MaCSA >0.3: Filtered except where 2 year age gap
c/ Minor to MaCSA >0.6: Filtered with no age gap
(2) There were some filters in place prior to taskforce using UnIS criteria and MaCSA previously, but these were still leaving a large number of exposures in PYMK between MaCSA<>Minor so the Taskforce work was plugging the gaps"
Sadaf ████: "[J]ust want to make sure i understand 'Minors are not recommended to potentially suspicious adults' was *not* in practice before the task force"
Kaitlin ████: "It sounds like there was some filtering of not recommending minors to suspicious adults AND vice versa before the task force, but it was not comprehensive and the task force made it better. What's definitely wholly new as of the task force is not recommending suspicious adults to each other (or anyone)... we were already doing some of Bullet #2 prior to the task force, just poorly… 'There were some filters in place prior to taskforce using UnIS criteria and MaCSA previously, but these were still leaving a large number of exposures in PYMK between MaCSA<>Minor so the Taskforce work was plugging the gaps')... My understanding… is that we had no filtering of recommending potentially suspicious adults to each other prior to the TF. We DID have some (though inadequate) filtering of sus adults to minors and vice versa…. So there are four types of recommendations:
1) Minors to Sus Adults
2) Sus Adults to Minors
3) Sus Adults to Sus Adults
4) Sus Adults to ANYONE
My understanding is both 1 & 2 existed before the TF but needed improvement and that 3 & 4 were net new."
Davis: "prior to task force it was limited to minors, post task force it was to anyone – that is correct"
Gabriel ████: "Yes. there was bi-directional risky adult <> minor filtering prior to the taskforce, though the interventions in each direction did not use the same filtering criteria. Adults filtered from Minor PYMK recs using MaCSA, migrated from previous IICIICInappropriate Interactions with ChildrenA classifier threshold and content category for interactions between adults and children indicative of grooming or exploitation, referred to internally as "a.k.a. 'grooming'". The source document puts the scale at "~500k victims per DAY in English markets only", three times Messenger's prevalence, while calling it "a preliminary metric" and adding "we expect the true situation is worse".Full entry ↗ classifier. In the taskforce audit we found that this intervention was not filtering all recommendations and needed to re-implement it to ensure it was not leaking exposures.
- Minor -> Adult using UnIs (legacy definition of risky pair). In the taskforce, we migrated this filter to the same MaCSA threshold as used elsewhere, which added a much broader volume of exposures and required escalation with Growth. The outcome of this escalation was that we created a 2 year age gap carveout, but implemented the MaCSA filtering for all other minor-> risky adult PYMK recommendations.
NET NEW delivered in taskforce
- "MaCSA 0.6 -> Filter from all users in PYMK"
- MaCSA 0.3 <> MaCSA 0.3 Filtering in PYMK"