"By failing to update account DOBs after they have been ID verified, we are facilitating age misrepresentation which could have harmful downstream effects."

"Monitoring SLA and job inventories (enforcement, appeals) / Taking actions to prevent SLA dropping, backlogs building, or jobs expiring: Maintaining our commitments to enforce underage policies and unblock falsely checkpointed accounts within a reasonable timeframe (48 hours). Open Questions: 1. Are the new teams going to care about the SLA? Should we still be caring about the SLA? 2. Should we set a deadline where we will no longer be acting to remedy any ops capacity issues?" "Deprecation of dormant checkpoint policy: Deprecation this indefensible policy as part of Roadmap to BASIC maturity." "Ensure legislation in Spain and South Korea is being applied properly: We enforce this correctly in most places - but we don't have proper testing to guarantee this, and without a proper audit we are at risk of enforcement (or communication) gaps. The age limit in Spain and South Korea is 14, rather than 13 in the rest of the world." "Reduce U13U13Under-13Users below the minimum age of 13 set by Meta's terms of service and by COPPA. "U13" denotes both the age cohort and the underage accounts Meta's own documents discuss detecting, removing, or building products for.Full entry ↗ retention window to 60d: Youth pXFN have advised us that it is not defensible to retain underage user data for 180d (the standard for admin scheduled deletions) - we need to coordinate with Deletion API and modify propagation behaviour to reduce this to 60d" "Understand and remove (or pXFN align) soft-linking enforcement against underage accounts for FB: We uncovered the use of soft-linking to disable FB accounts for being underage. We are unsure why and want to understand what this is being triggered by. We have no ground truth for what an underage account is, so we cannot measure the precision of an approach where we remove soft-linked accounts. In the current situation, this approach may be indefensible" "Update DOB to the DOB of the submitted ID when a user successfully appeals the underage checkpoint: On IG we don't update DOB when appeal is successful, on FB we do but we believe it may be broken (as updating DOB is blocked when account is restricted). By failing to update account DOBs after they have been ID verified, we are facilitating age misrepresentation which could have harmful downstream effects." "Restrict Adult Classifier enforcement automation policy to supported regions: One of the automations we run on reports of users being underage relies on the adult classifier model from core dimensions. At the moment on Instagram we are calling this model for users in unsupported regions and actioning them based on their stated age instead of realising they have no prediction and skipping this automation policy for them. Ignoring reports of accounts being underage based on their stated age is a poor approach and means we are likely ignoring reports of many legitimately underage accounts." "Add the ability to include content from messages or posts in our underage enforcement review jobs: At the moment our third party report review doesn't include any message or post content from users, so totally lacks any insight into place where users have admitted to being underage. Our review protocol is currently based almost exclusively on account photos. If the account in question has admitted to being underage via message or post, we may still end up ignoring them despite them self-admitting. This is quite an indefensible enforcement gap" "Audit U13 escalations that lead to immediate disables: We probably shouldn't be escalating to immediate disables - we have a policy to always allow users to appeal for 30 days. This is a poor user experience and given we lack visibility into the precision of our enforcement (as we lack a ground truth) is likely too extreme an approach" "Understand why such a high proportion of reported accounts are reported multiple times by the same reporters: 16% of accounts reported for being underage are reported multiple times by the same reporter. Understand why such a high proportion of reported accounts are reported multiple time by different reporters: 8% of accounts reported for being underage are reported multiple times by different reporters. We are less likely to checkpoint these accounts than those reported by only a single reporter. We don't understand why this is. In theory, multiple people reporting an account for being underage should be a strong signal the account is underage. In reality, it is the opposite." "Deprecate dormant account policy: The dormant account policy automation (auto-checkpoint reported accounts which have been inactive for over 30 days) was only ever shipped as an emergency solution to a large backlog - it is not defensible long term as there's no known correlation between account dormancy and underage users, nor is there any correlation expected." "Invest in further automations for enforcement jobs: We have flat ops capacity this half. Finding a way to reduce our ops demand with enforcement job automations frees up capacity that we may be able to use for iniatives to drive down underage prevalence" "Develop 'Adult Age Misrepresentation' VT & Enforcement: We have already established Adult Age Misrepresentation (Adults pretending to be teens) as a new violation type. We still need to development enforcement for this violation. AAM is a serious violation from child safety perspective as evident from linked case study, we currently do not enforce proactivly on age lying." "Fix EditDOB AutoClassifiers: We run classifiers to determine if we should permit a user's date of birth change. The use of this classifiers for this purpose is broken and means we aren't gating date of birth changes based on our adult classifiers or inappropriate-interactions with children classifier." "Enable captcha protection on FB reporting contact forms: At the moment our underage reporting contact forms on FB are not as well protected against scripted attacks as they could be. We've previously had a SEV because of scripted attacks on our IG reporting form, which is now captcha protected."